The BIG 4 Role in Moderating the Detection of Fraud Pentagon Against Fraudulent Financial Reports (Study on Indonesian Public Sector Government Companies) by Aviantara, Ryan
 International Journal of Sciences: 










The BIG 4 Role in Moderating the Detection of Fraud 
Pentagon Against Fraudulent Financial Reports (Study on 
Indonesian Public Sector Government Companies) 
Ryan Aviantara* 




This research aims to analyze the role of Big 4 Firms (EY, PWC, Deloitte, KPMG) in moderating the fraud 
pentagon effect of pressure, rationalization, opportunity, competence, and arrogance against fraudulent financial 
reports. Data taken from annual reports included in BUMN20 Index from Indonesian stock exchange during 
2016-2018. Using the purposive sampling technique comprise of 66 companies with statistical analysis and 
regression model by EViews. Results of this research are (1) Financial Stability which measured by Asset Grow 
as the proxy of Pressure element from Fraud Pentagon, has significant effect to the likelihood of Fraudulent 
Financial Reports, (2) New proxied of Rationalization which measured by Government Ownership has 
significant effect to the likelihood of Fraudulent Financial Reports, (3) BIG 4 proven can moderate by 
weakening the Fraud Pentagon effect to the Fraudulent Financial Reports.   
Keywords: BUMN; Indonesia; Auditor; Fraud Pentagon; Restatement; Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
1. Introduction  
1.1. Background 
This last three years must be marked as fraud years to Indonesian public, a spotlight for the accountant 
practicioners, accountant academics, and accountant students as well. There are three big cases of financial 
reports dragging the BIG 4 accounting firms.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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The first is Ernst & Young (EY-Indonesia) conducted audit failure over PT Indosat Tbk (ISAT) financial 
statements as of year 2011. For those the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issuing 
sanctions called an “Order instituting disciplinary proceedings, making findings and imposing sanctions”, 
impact to restatement of audit financial year 2011, and EY agreed to pay a fine worth USD 1 million, announced 
at 9 February 2017 Washington time [19].  The second is PT Sunprima Nusantara Pembiayaan (SNP Finance) 
which has been audited with unqualified opinied by Deloitte Indonesia, apparently failed to pay medium term 
notes interest which not disclosed in its audited financial statements. Looses incurred due to this case are worth 
of IDR 2,4 billion from the formation of reserves absorbing risk over outstanding credit of 14 banks. As the 
results, SNP Finance must accept the sanction of being frozen its financing business activities, and OJK as the 
Indonesian financial services authority give sanctioned by cancellation the registration for public accountant 
office aside with its two accountants.  The third is PT Garuda Indonesia Tbk (GIAA) with the auditors BDO 
Indonesia investigated by authorites because because surprisingly makes unusual profit of USD 809,85 thousand 
after prior year bear a loss of USD 216,5 million. According of that Indonesian ministry of finance fine a 
suspension of permits for 12 months to the accountant. OJK fine to the board of directors and commissioners by 
IDR 100 million each. BEI as the Indonesian stock exchange authorities fine worth of IDR 100 million. And 
GIAA is required to correct and restate their financial reports within three weeks. Fraudulent Financial Reports 
(FFR) is the most detrimental type of corporate fraud as reported in a recent global study by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners and its impact exceeds the financial losses [1]. FFR is more likely to be carried out 
by management, and sometimes referred to as management fraud [25]. The author in [30] noted that FFR is 
difficult to detect because it is often done by a team whose highly motivated and possess quality, and has good 
understanding to avoid internal control activities. However, understanding the motivation behind fraud 
committed by management is the key of detection [22]. External auditors can assist in detecting fraudulent 
financial reports, this should be realized if they begin to think beyond the numbers of the the financial 
statements only, but also pay more attention to management motivation, because that is the key antecedent for 
fraud [23]. Together with that, Indonesian Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) on August 2017 
published an article “Survai Fraud Indonesia 2016” resulted that the Indonesian government company is the 
most harmed sector with fraud practice by 58.8% [2]! This is very embarrassing and being a big work for the 
government itself and the citizen as well.  
 
Figure 1: Industry harmed by fraud based on Survai Fraud Indonesia 2016 
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Therefore this study aim to reveal the trigger of fraudster by taken data sampling from BUMN20 as known as 
the government index issuer company in the Indonesian stock market. 
1.2. Agency Theory 
The problem of information asymmetry is the basis of any problem of conflict of interest and consequently 
increases the risk of fraud. Managers have an obligation to convey information in accordance with the actual 
condition of the company to shareholders, but sometimes the information submitted is not in accordance with 
the actual situation. So, fraud can occur because it is armed with more information about the company [17]. 
Information asymmetry is a condition in which agents have more information about a company than principals 
so managers tend to try to manipulate reported company performance [15]. According to author in [29] who 
stated that the agency relationship is a contract between managers (agents) with investors (principal). Principal 
is a shareholder, while the agent means management that manages the company. Principals always desire a high 
return on investment incurred for the company, while agents have their own interests which is to get 
compensation and greater results for their performance. This shows that there is a conflict of interest between 
principals and agents, named capital owners and capital managers or company management. Conflicts of 
interest between agents and principals are often referred to as conflicts of interest. Agency theory derived by 
three assumptions: 1) Human which grouped into three: self-interest, bounded rationality and risk aversion. 2) 
Organizational which grouped into three: conflict as the goal between participants, efficiency as an effectiveness 
criterion, and information asymmetry between principals and agents. 3) Information which assumed that state of 
information is a commodity that can be purchased [10].  Conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent 
lead to the attitude of distrust, because agent will act in the interests of personal interests and not maximize the 
interests of the principal. This condition provides a great opportunity for agents to commit fraud. Fraud occurs 
because of human nature, selfishness, having limited thinking power regarding future perceptions (bounded 
rationality), and always risk averse. Self interest regard to pressureness, capabilities, and arrogance factors, on 
the other side risk averse regard to opportunities and rationalisations factors [4].  
1.3. Fraud Pentagon 
The Fraud Pentagon [16] is the result of the Fraud Triangle [7]. This model was introduced by Crowe Horwath 
LLP,. Adjusting the current cultural and environmental developments, Crowe's Fraud Pentagon Model adds two 
elements: (1) Arrogance; and (2) Capability / Competency.  
 
Figure 2: Crowe’s Fraud Pentagon 
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It said that the Fraud Pentagon has a broader fraud scheme and involves manipulation by the CEO and CFO. 
This is come from the many manipulations of financial reports by the internal company executives because of 
the authority they have and the easy access to information over financial reports. 
Briefly look into the relationship between agency theory and the 5 elements in the fraud model shall be :  
1. Pressure: The motivation of management to commit fraud, for example the lack of income earned, the 
need for a better life, those becomes a trigger for management to act on self-interest. 
2. Rationalization: Justification arises in the mind of the offender when the fraud has occurred. This 
justification arises because of the desire in the perpetrators to remain safe and free from punishment. 
3. Opportunity: Creating an opportunity to commit fraud due to weakness of management control. This 
situation will be used by management to commit fraud in secret as not to be known by others. 
4. Competence: The ability that someone has to commit fraud. The existence of self-interest from 
management to get a lot of benefits for themselves, so they do not act as the benefit of the principal 
anymore. 
5. Arrogance: Haughty attitude that considers someone is capable of cheating. This trait arises because of 
self-interest in management leads the arrogance even greater, this trait will trigger the emergence of 
belief that someone will not be known if fraud occurs, while the existing sanctions cannot befall him. 
1.4. Fraudulent Financial Reports 
Fraudulent Financial Reports (FFR) is the intentional misstatement or omission of a number, or disclosure in a 
financial statements that aims to deceive users of the financial statements it self [20, 28], while according to [5] 
FFR is the misstatements or omissions of intentional amounts or disclosures with a view to deceiving users of 
financial statements. Many cases of fraud in financial statements including those more concerned with the 
recognition of assets, income or neglect of liabilities. In the “fraud tree” developed by ACFE, fraudulent 
financial statements are divided into two parts: (1) Asset or revenue overstatements, and (2) Asset / revenue 
understatements. 
 
Figure 3: Fraud Tree by ACFE 
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2. Hypothesis Development and Prior Research  
Number of total assets owned by the company is the main attraction for investors, creditors, and other decision 
makers. When the total assets owned by the company are quite a lot, the company is considered capable of 
providing maximum returns for investors. But on the reversal, if the total assets have decreased or even negative 
can make investors, creditors and decision-makers become not interested, because the condition of the company 
is considered unstable, the company is considered unable to operate properly and not profitable. Research by 
author in [12] concluded that the financial responsibility was significant to the FFR, this was also supported by 
author research [8, 4].  
H1 : Financial Stability lead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
External pressure will cause management to seek loans from other parties so that the company can compete with 
competitors. If the company has high leverage, it means that the company is considered to have a large debt, and 
the credit risk is high. The higher of credit risk, the higher level concern of creditors to provide loans to 
companies. Therefore, this has become one of the concerns of the company and is possible to be one of the causes 
in the emergence of fraudulent financial reporting. Research by author in [8] explained that external pressure has 
significant effect to FFR, this is corroborated with others research in [11, 24]. 
H2 : External Pressure lead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
Authors in [21] developed a variable using the logistic regression analysis that can be used to proxy the size of the 
pressure and opportunity components based on Cressey's fraud triangle theory and adopted from SAS No. 99 [3]. 
Based on the results of the analysis, it was concluded that the financial target proxied with the Return on Assets 
(ROA) proven to have a significant effect on the likelihood of FFR. The emergence of pressure on achieving 
financial targets to get bonuses on performance results, and maintaining the existence of company performance 
can raise the possibilities of pressure on achieve financial targets. 
H3 : Financial Target lead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
Research from [8, 11, 14] are used institutional ownership as their measurement, while another researcher [4] 
put the managerial ownership on her research. However, due to this study taken on government companies, the 
author assumes when there is government ownership in the company, it will be a kind of rationalization for the 
management to do the FFR, as reported in the beginning that the government sector is categorized as high level 
of fraud in Indonesia [2]. This is new measurement for testing the hyphothesis. 
H4 : Government Ownership lead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
Change in auditor used by the company can be considered as a way to eliminate traces of fraud which found by 
the previous auditor. This tendency encourages companies to replace independent auditors. According to SAS 
No. 99 states that with the presence of auditor change within the company, fraud can be indicated [3]. The 
former auditors may be more aware in detection of fraud by management, so the possibility of the fraud will be 
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higher. The results of this analysis supported by other authors in [17, 27]. 
H5 : Auditor Change lead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
Ineffective monitoring is a condition in which there is no effective internal control system in the company. SAS 
No. 99 explained this can occur in the process of financial reporting and internal control due to the dominance 
of management by one person or small group [3], without any compensation control, ineffective supervision of 
the board of commissioners and audit committee. Those proven by research from [17]. 
H6 : Ineffective Monitoring lead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
Author in [31] suggested that changes in directors are able to cause a stress period which results in more 
opportunities for fraud. Substitution of directors can be an attempt by the company to improve the performance 
of the previous directors by changing the composition of the directors, or recruiting new directors who are 
considered more competent. The change of directors can also indicate a certain political interest to replace the 
previous board of directors, while on the other hand, the change of directors is considered to reduce 
effectiveness in performance because it requires more time to adapt to the culture of new directors, research 
from [12, 18] proved this. 
H7 : Director Change lead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
The number of CEO photos displayed in a company's annual report can represent the level of arrogance or 
superiority that the CEO has. A CEO tends to want to show everyone the status and position he has in the 
company because they do not want to lose that status or position (or feel they are not considered), this is 
accordance with one of the elements as described in Fraud Pentagon [16]. And also supported by others research 
[8, 12, 17]. 
H8 : CEO Picture lead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
Appointment of the external auditor by the company's audit committee is considered able to carry out an 
independent audits, to avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure the integrity of the audit process. Research on the 
quality of external auditors focuses on the difference between the selection of audit services from BIG 4 public 
accounting firms and non BIG 4. The reason for this is that BIG 4 considered to have more ability to detect and 
reveal reporting errors in management. According to research from [13] shows that external auditors working at 
large audit firms have more ability to detect fraud compared to companies audited by smaller audit firms. 
H9 : BIG 4 mislead to Fraudulent Financial Reports. 
As mentioned in prior hypothesis that BIG 4 public accounting firms consist of EY, PWC, Deloitte, KPMG 
having more ability to detect and reveal reporting errors in management compared to non BIG 4. Hence, the role 
of BIG 4 is expected to be a deduction (weakening) for the practice of fraud. This is new moderating 
measurement for hyphothesis design. 
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H10 : BIG 4 weakening the Fraud Pentagon effect to Fraudulent Financial Reports as moderator variable. 
 
Figure 4: Hyphothesis Framework 
3. Research Methodology  
3.1. Population and Sample 
This research population is companies listed on the BEI (Indonesian Stock Exchange) within 2016 - 2018. 
While the samples taken from BUMN as Government Listed Companies as identified by “Persero Tbk”. The 
sample selection technique used is purposive sampling with the criteria of issuers including in BUMN20 index, 
hence the total sample is 66 for three years observation. 
3.2. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this research uses restatement of financial reports as a proxy for fraudulent financial 
reportings. The authors in [8, 26] explained that restatement can give a signal or a sign of fraud in financial 
reports. Empirically, fraud that occurred in corporations including banks recently revealed ex-post facto. In line 
with previous research, restatement was chosen as a proxy for indications of fraud because it is difficult to 
obtain real data from companies who commit fraud. Companies categorized to restate financial statements are 
companies who carry out by results from fundamental errors, reclassifications, transactions with special parties, 
and restatements which are not caused by policy changes and accounting estimates due to the convergence of 
the Indonesian Financial Accounting Standards (PSAK) and International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). 
The restatement of financial statements is measured using a dummy variable, where code “1” is for showing the 
company that is restated, and code “0” for non restated. 
Opportunity (+) 
Ineffective Monitoring (H6)  
 
Rationalization (+) 
Government Ownership (H4) 
Auditor Change (H5) 
 
Pressure (+) 
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3.3. Independent and Moderating Variable 
Table 1: Variable Measurement 
No Variable Model Measurement Scale 
1 Financial Stability AGROW Total Aset (t) - Total Aset (t-1) Ratio 
      Total Aset (t-1)   
2 External Pressure LEV Total Liability Ratio 
      Total Asset   
3 Financial Target ROA Net Profit Ratio 
      Total Asset   
4 Government Ownership GOVSHIP 
Percentage of share ownership 
by the government 
Ratio 
5 Auditor Change APCHG 
Dummy variable, 1 = Any 
replacement, 0 = vice versa 
Nominal 
6 Ineffective Monitoring IBOC 
Persentage of number 
independent commissioner to 
total board of commissioner 
Ratio 
7 Director Change CBOD Total directors replacement Nominal 
8 CEO Picture CEOP 
Total CEO photos in annual 
report 
Nominal 
9 BIG 4 Firms BIG4 
Dummy variable, 1 = Audit by 
BIG 4, 0 = vice versa 
Nominal 
3.4. Regression Model 
Table 2: Regression Model 
 
4. Results and Discussions  
4.1. Hypothesis testing without moderation 
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Table 3: Eviews regression result without moderation 
Dependent Variable: REST?                       
Method: Pooled Least Squares                       
Date: 07/27/19   Time: 23:35                       
Sample: 2016 2018                       
Included observations: 3                       
Cross-sections included: 22                       
Total pool (balanced) observations: 66                      
                         
                         Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.                       
                         
                         C -2.655297 1.895160 -1.401094 0.1726                     
AGROW? 0.347998 0.163787 2.124707 0.0429        H1            
LEV? -0.907451 1.613473 -0.562421 0.5785        H2             
ROA? -0.020213 0.078072 -0.258897 0.7977        H3             
GOVSHIP? 8.522208 4.119971 2.068512 0.0483        H4            
APCHG? -0.176594 0.201519 -0.876316 0.3886        H5             
IBOC? -0.226068 0.977151 -0.231354 0.8188        H6             
CBOD? -0.019280 0.052894 -0.364500 0.7183        H7             
CEOP? 0.012211 0.025913 0.471222 0.6413        H8             
BIG4? 2.250987 2.029068 1.109370 0.2771        H9             
                         
                         
H1 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.0429, indicates that Financial Stability which measured by 
AGROW as the proxy of Pressure element from Fraud Pentagon, has significant effect to the likelihood of 
Fraudulent Financial Reports. This is in line with perception that number of total assets owned by the company 
is the main attraction for the investors, creditors, and other decision makers, when the total assets owned by the 
company are quite a lot, that is considered capable of providing maximum returns for the investors. This is agree 
with antecedent study [4, 8, 12]. 
H2 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.5785, indicates that External Pressure which measured by LEV 
as the proxy of Pressure element from Fraud Pentagon, doesn't has significant effect to the likelihood of 
Fraudulent Financial Reports. Antecedent study [8, 11, 24] which indicate the management to seek loans from 
other parties to compete with competitors, so that the company has high leverage and high credit risk. The 
higher of credit risk, the higher level concern for creditors to provide loans to companies not proven in this 
research. 
H3 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.7977, indicates that Financial Target which measured by ROA 
as the proxy of Pressure element from Fraud Pentagon, doesn't has significant effect to the likelihood of 
Fraudulent Financial Reports. Antecedent study [21] which indicate that the emergence of pressure on achieving 
financial targets to get bonuses on performance results, and maintaining the existence of company performance 
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can raise the possibilities of pressure on achieve the financial targets not proven in this research. 
H4 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.0483, indicates that Government Ownership which measured by 
GOVSHIP as the proxy of Rationalization element from Fraud Pentagon, has significant effect to the likelihood 
of Fraudulent Financial Reports. This proven the author perception when there is a major government ownership 
in the company, it will become a rationalization for the management to do the FFR. No antecedent study proved 
this proxy and measurement, hence this shall be a contribution for the next research development.  
H5 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.3886, indicates that Auditor Change which measured by 
APCHG as the proxy of Rationalization element from Fraud Pentagon, doesn't has significant effect to the 
likelihood of Fraudulent Financial Reports. Antecedent study  [17, 27] which indicate that change in auditor 
used by the company can be considered as a way to eliminate traces of fraud which found by the previous 
auditor. This tendency encourages companies to replace independent auditors not proven in this research. 
H6 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.8188, indicates that Ineffective Monitoring which measured by 
IBOC as the proxy of Opportunity element from Fraud Pentagon, doesn't has significant effect to the likelihood 
of Fraudulent Financial Reports. Antecedent study [17] which indicate that if there is no effective internal 
control design system, less supervision of the board of commissioners and audit committee, fraud can occur in 
the process of financial reporting due to the dominance of management by one person or small group not proven 
in this research. 
H7 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.7183, indicates that Director Change which measured by 
CBOD as the proxy of Competence element from Fraud Pentagon, doesn't has significant effect to the likelihood 
of Fraudulent Financial Reports. Antecedent study [12, 18] which indicate that changes in directors can be an 
attempt by the company to improve the performance of the previous directors or recruiting new directors who 
are considered more competent, and considered to reduce effectiveness in performance were able to cause a 
stress period, because it requires more time to adapt to the culture of the new directors, this lead to more 
exposure for doing fraud but not proven in this research. 
H8 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.6413, indicates that CEO Picture which measured by CEOP as 
the proxy of Arrogance element from Fraud Pentagon, doesn't has significant effect to the likelihood of 
Fraudulent Financial Reports. Antecedent study [8, 12, 17] which indicate that number of CEO photos displayed 
in a company's annual report represent the level of arrogance or superiority from the CEO who tends to show 
the status and the position, not proven in this research. 
H9 : Hypothesis testing result with prob value 0.2771, indicates that BIG 4 accounting firms which measured by 
BIG4 doesn't has significant effect to the likelihood of Fraudulent Financial Reports. Antecedent study [13] 
which indicate that BIG 4 as an independent variable directly have more cability to curb the malpractice of 
financial statements not proven in this research. 
4.2. Hypothesis testing with moderation 
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Table 4: Eviews regression result with moderation 
Dependent Variable: REST?                       
Method: Pooled Least Squares                       
Date: 07/27/19   Time: 23:35                       
Sample: 2016 2018                       
Included observations: 3                       
Cross-sections included: 22                       
Total pool (balanced) observations: 66                      
                         
                         Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.                       
                         
                         C -2.655297 1.895160 -1.401094 0.1726                     
AGROWXBIG4? -0.718402 0.301073 -2.386139 0.0243                     
LEVXBIG4? -0.013500 1.992293 -0.006776 0.9946                     
ROABIG4? -0.041182 0.083374 -0.493944 0.6253                     
GOVSHIPXBIG4? -3.200128 2.846278 -1.124320 0.2708                     
APCHGXBIG4? -0.000694 0.284154 -0.002441 0.9981                     
IBOCXBIG4? -0.394664 1.396908 -0.282527 0.7797                     
CBODXBIG4? -0.008755 0.064326 -0.136096 0.8928                     
CEOPXBIG4? -0.021179 0.042781 -0.495048 0.6246                     
                         
                         
H10 : Hypothesis testing result with negative coefficient and prob value 0.0243, proven that BIG 4 can moderate 
by weakening the Pressure element (Financial Stability - AGROW) from Fraud Pentagon to the likelihood of 
Fraudulent Financial Reports. No antecedent study used this moderating variable, hence this shall be a 
contribution for the next research development. However, appointment external auditor generally consider as 
commitment from the principal to avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure the integrity of the audit process 
itself. Research on the quality of external auditors focuses on the selection of audit services from BIG 4 (EY, 
PWC, Deloitte, KPMG) which considered to have more ability in detecting and revealing the reporting errors in 
management. Moreover external auditors expected to be able to assist in detecting fraudulent financial reports 
by give more attention to management motivation as the key antecedent for fraud [23]. 
5. Conclussions and Recommendations  
5.1. Conclussions 
Results of this research shows that (1) Financial Stability which measured Asset Grow as the proxy of Pressure 
element from Fraud Pentagon has significant effect to the likelihood of Fraudulent Financial Reports, this 
proven the perception of high value of assets which owned by the company is the main attraction for the 
investors, creditors, and other decision makers in providing the maximum returns. (2) New proxied of 
Rationalization which measured by Government Ownership has significant effect to the likelihood of Fraudulent 
Financial Reports, this proven the author perception when there is a major government ownership in the 
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company, it will become a rationalization for the management to make up the financial report (3) BIG 4 can 
moderate by weakening the Fraud Pentagon effect to the Fraudulent Financial Reports, this proven the top tier 
of accounting firms (EY, PWC, Deloitte, KPMG) are able to avoid conflicts of interest, ensure the integrity of 
the audit process, and perform higher assurance in detecting and revealing the reporting errors than others. 
5.2. Recommendations 
This research can develop and modified further by (1) Use the m-scores / beneish model [6] as the FFR 
measurement. (2) Use the f-scores dechow model [9] as the FFR measurement. (3) Use 5-10 years time series to 
extent the effect from other independent variables. (4) Use finance or banking institutional for purposive 
sampling as this is the second high level of fraud sector as reported by ACFE [2]. (5) Use “corruption” as Y 
variable as this is one of the most important issue in emerging country.  
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